(Un)structured reform of the prosecutor’s system: between viable solutions and systematic risks. Op-ed by Iulian Groza
To the attention of decision-makers, especially parliamentarians.
This morning, Veronica Mihailov-Moraru, Minister of Justice, presented, in a press conference, three policy options in the context of the extraordinary meeting announced by the Parliament’s Secretariat, as a result of the recommendation of the recent meeting of the Supreme Security Council. From the little public information available, this extraordinary session announced by the Parliament, aims to examine legislative amendments that aim, among other things, “to establish a unitary normative framework, based on common principles, applicable to the process of preventing and combating organized crime, as well as to strengthen the institutional architecture of the bodies responsible for combating and preventing organized crime.”
The first approach proposed by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Moldova – two complementary options, feasible without structural reforms
These solutions can be implemented within the existing institutional framework by the Prosecutor General’s Office (GPO) and the Superior Council of Prosecutors (SCP), without making major legislative or structural interventions, reducing the risk of generating systemic imbalances, namely:
- Creation of a specialized section within the GPO, which would allow a better prioritization and monitoring of complex cases of political corruption and organized crime.
- Operationalization of the Special Section of the GPO for Combating Corruption and Money Laundering, by supplementing it with seconded prosecutors. This could also be strengthened by creating joint investigation teams on complex cases.
This approach is supported by several lawyers, national experts, which was also mentioned during the consultations organized by the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Moldova. This approach is one that also reflects the recommendations of international experts, including OECD specialists, with whom we are collaborating on the functional analysis of the Prosecutor General’s Office – a document to be presented at the end of February 2025.
The proposed measures are achievable in the short term, directly contributing to increasing the efficiency of prosecutors in the fight against organised crime and corruption. They do not require structural reforms that would involve time, impact analyses and risk management. Given that the GPO is already in the process of reorganization, these solutions would fit organically within the framework of the reform started and can be quickly applied by the GPO and SCP, with the support of the Ministry of Justice, if necessary.
Second approach – structural reform targeting specialized prosecutors’ offices
It involves merging the two current specialized prosecutors’ offices (APO and PCCOCS) – a rushed, risky and unprepared measure, which could generate systemic problems greater than those it aims to solve.
Apart from a few announced elements, the public opinion and the interested parties in the prosecutor’s office system know very little about this initiative. At the moment, there is no clear argumentation, an impact analysis on institutional capacities and risks, nor a clear vision for implementation.
The way in which such an approach is being promoted, at least at the moment, circumvents the principles of transparency of the legislative process, but also potentially conflicts with the legal rigours regarding the elaboration and promotion of public policies, including Government regulations regarding the process of creating legislation.
Moreover, this alleged complex reform, which appeared suddenly and justified only by references to models from other countries, cannot be automatically taken over in the specific context of the Republic of Moldova.
In addition, this initiative is not found in any national strategy paper, nor in the Strategy on ensuring the independence and integrity of the justice sector for 2022-2025. It is also not found in the Draft Roadmap in the field of the rule of law, which the Government must assume in the context of the EU accession negotiations, being directly relevant to Cluster 1.
Some of the short-term consequences of the hasty promotion of this reform:
- Deepening the crisis in the prosecutor’s office system – In the short term, especially in an election year, this initiative will not solve the main problem – increasing the efficiency of the prosecutor’s office in combating organized crime and corruption.
On the contrary, in the coming months, until the parliamentary elections, these disorderly changes risk further reducing the efficiency of the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office and the PCCOCS, which already have several major files under examination, including those initiated in the context of last year’s elections. This could affect the entire system, generating risks to the efficiency of investigations in ongoing cases.
- Risk for the General Assembly of Prosecutors of 11 February, 2025 recently convened by the Superior Council of Prosecutors – This situation could jeopardize the orderly organization of the General Assembly of Prosecutors, which has an essential role in electing the members of the SCP who passed the vetting, but also in approving critical decisions for the functioning of the prosecutor’s office.
- Negative impact on the timing of accession negotiations with the EU
This initiative, the way in which it is being promoted, non-transparent, without substantiation and without consultations, could be perceived as a setback in Brussels. Last year, the Government and the European Commission, following a colossal effort, completed the bilateral screening on Cluster 1 in less than 5 months. Currently, the Government is in the final stage of consultation and approval of the three Roadmaps (Rule of Law, Democratic Institutions and Public Administration Reform). The European Commission’s report on Cluster 1 is, for now, favourable to Moldova and is to be examined by the member states.
If this structural reform with regard to specialized prosecutors’ offices is advanced in the current manner, there is a risk that:
– The European Commission to review the report and postpone its approval;
– The political decision to launch negotiations on Cluster 1 should be delayed;
– The opening of the first negotiation chapters, which were expected until the summer, is delayed.
- Real priority: the work of the Vetting Commission No. 3 – Authorities and development partners should focus on adjusting the work of the Vetting Commission No. 3, whose work is supported by the INL. In the recent context of the suspension of US assistance for the next three months, this period is crucial for the continuation of the process of ethical and financial evaluation of prosecutors.
Instead of conclusion:
– Any major structural reform requires time, preparation and a deep analysis of the risks.
– To identify sustainable solutions, any public policy and structural reform must clearly and prioritise the systemic problem, not just an individual situation.
– Accelerating this process in an election year, risks creating chaos and instability.
– Specific problems must be addressed through concrete measures, not through structural changes that can destabilize the entire system.
In this context, the first two options presented by the Ministry of Justice are much more viable and efficient than an unprepared comprehensive reform, which could jeopardize both the stability of the prosecutor’s office system and the European path of the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, the first approach does not require legislative interventions, it falls within the framework initiated by the reorganization of the Prosecutor General’s Office, and more importantly it is within the legal mandate of the Prosecutor General and the Superior Council of Prosecutors.
Iulian Groza is the executive director of the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE, Chisinau)
This op-ed is prepared within the project “Ensuring the integrity, efficiency and independence of the justice system in Moldova – #Justice4Moldova, funded by the European Union and co-financed by the Soros Foundation Moldova. The content of the material belongs to the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and the Soros Foundation Moldova.
