IPRE’s Policy Brief: informational resilience at grassroots level in the Republic of Moldova

In the Republic of Moldova, combating disinformation and countering foreign information and manipulation interference (FIMI) is mainly the responsibility of central actors. While resilience at the local level is mainly supported by civil society and media initiatives. To strengthen information resilience in local communities, an approach focused on combating disinformation, promoting critical thinking, media literacy and local media development is needed. In the context of hybrid attacks by the Russian Federation against the Republic of Moldova, Chisinau must ensure a minimum level of awareness on FIMI-related issues. Without it, strengthening information resilience at the local level will be incomplete and ineffective.

In this context, Alina Doroftei, an expert in the field of diplomacy and foreign relations, has developed a policy brief for the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE) in which she analyzes the challenges and tools needed to combat disinformation and counter foreign information interference and manipulation, which are the central actors with the role of strengthening information resilience at the level of the entire society, as well as what ways of cooperation between authorities and community can be used/created in order to create participatory mechanisms, oriented to the needs of the communities.

According to the author, the fight against disinformation is a long-standing one in the Republic of Moldova, reaching acute phases after the Russian aggression against Ukraine and constituting an essential pillar of the Russian hybrid attack on the Republic of Moldova. Although some punitive levers applied by the SIS have been strengthened, especially during the state of emergency and recently also by the Board of Directors, a more complex approach to combating disinformation is needed, including at the local level, which should include elements related to critical thinking, media development and training of journalists, and at the central level the development of cooperation with social networks,  strengthening the community of debunkers, strategic communication from the authorities.

At the same time, disinformation is not only a persistent security threat, but also has a demonstrable association with an external actor, Russia. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Moldova (entered into force on January 17, 2024) refers to “hybrid operations carried out by the Russian Federation against the Republic of Moldova in the political, economic, energy, social, informational, cybernetic fields, etc., with the aim of undermining the constitutional order, derailing the country’s European course and/or disintegrating the state.” The target of the Russian hybrid attack at the local level seems to be to preserve and even deepen the cleavages in society based on linguistic and identity criteria.

“According to the IRI’s poll in July 2024, local authorities represent the institution with the highest public trust (74%), surpassing even the Metropolitan Church of Moldova (65%). Therefore, the natural question is: should mayors and other local authorities get involved in combating disinformation? The short answer is YES and probably some mayors do it in the context of interaction with the community, even if not in an explicit and systematic manner. On the other hand, some mayors are affiliated with political actors who base their political campaigns on disinformation and external information manipulation,” says Alina Doroftei.

The expert believes that when asked about the involvement of local actors in combating disinformation, allocating resources and implementing mechanisms, three conditions can be identified to be taken into account for building resilience from the grassroots:

1. The fight against disinformation and FIMI must be considered as an explicit main objective through campaigns, discussions, publications and infographics, but based on topics of local interest and dissociated from political communication.
2. The approach must be two-way, based on local needs, but with resources allocated from the central level.
3. The effort must be sustained, long-lasting, going beyond small projects or ad-hoc activities.

Thus, Alina Doroftei concludes that building informational resilience at the grassroots level is not only necessary, but is essential for a “whole-of-society approach”. However, it needs the involvement of all actors who aim at the European integration of the Republic of Moldova and the consolidation of democracy and security. Central and local public institutions, as well as civil society actors, can start such an approach, starting by bringing stakeholders to the same table with the objective of developing new initiatives on the three components – awareness, countering and societal resilience to disinformation and FIMI, with the inclusion of aspects of promoting information literacy and social cohesion.

Following the analysis carried out, the following recommendations are proposed.

For central authorities and other actors involved in countering disinformation and FIMI:

• Preparation of short materials, in Romanian and Russian, based on monitoring reports and their dissemination through libraries, schools and information centers.
• Explanation by the Audiovisual Council (AC) and the media of the legislative and methodological aspects regarding the fight against disinformation.
• Creation of guides and training modules by the StratCom Center on the topic of disinformation and hybrid attacks, addressed to local actors.
• Organizing regular discussions and debates in localities on disinformation topics relevant to communities.

For local public authorities (LPAs), schools and associations:

• Active involvement in countering disinformation and training on FIMI tools.
• Improve understanding of the impact of disinformation on communities and work with central authorities for more effective campaigns.
• Allocating human and financial resources to support local efforts to counter disinformation.
• Designation of persons at the level of mayoralties or district councils as contact points for combating disinformation.
• Organising regular discussions with citizens about disinformation and FIMI.
• Taking over good practices from other European communities and participating in international initiatives to combat disinformation, such as Summit4Democracy.

For NGOs, media and civil society:

• Facilitating the exchange of information on local projects and improving the complementarity of initiatives.
• Preparing simplified materials and disseminating them locally.
• Identification of an organization to take over the role of “secretariat” to coordinate communication between local and central actors.
• Involvement of “Media Literacy” teachers in peer-to-peer initiatives and the development of local actions.
• Continuation of “door to door” projects to increase local capacities.
• Supporting the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education in the implementation of the Information and Media Literacy Plan 2024-2026.

For more details, please refer to the IPRE Analytical Note, available here.

This policy brief is developed within the IPRE project ” Public Policy Briefs”, implemented out with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) in the Republic of Moldova. The opinions reflected in this publication belong to the author and do not reflect the opinion of KAS.